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ABSTRACT The African elite has the advantage in the competition for top government
positions and other scarce socio-political and economic resources. The patron-client system
which the elite controls, in most cases using the state apparati, provides the major basis for
arguing that ethnicity is an ideology of inter-elite competition. While agreeing that the elite
is fragmented enough to be masters of the ethnic strategy in a situation where the rest of the
society is largely illiterate, this paper argues that the conception of ethnicity as an
-ideology- of inter-elite competition is too limited and inadequate. First, ethnicity is not
just an ideology; it is a reality of every multiethnic society, and this reality manifests both in
cultural and non-cultural ways. Second, ethnicity, as an effective strategy and major
manipulative tool in the competition for societal resources, is not an exclusive preserve of
the elite. It is also available to the non-elite who are empirically adept at what I call an elite-
challenging ethnicity.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most popular perspectives in the study of ethnicity is the elite perspec-
tive which posits that ethnicity is an ideology employed by the elites to further their
constitutive interests. Ethnicity is, as Sklar (1967: 6) says, "a mask for class
privilege." Remarkably, this is one perspective in which the conclusions of radical
and bourgeois scholars do not differ too much. This is little surprising, consider-
ing that the analysis of ethnicity in class terms is the vogue and that, in theoretical
terms, this mode of analysis marks a major advance over earlier modes which were
mostly Eurocentric and treated ethnicity as a mark of backwardness.tl ) In par-
ticular, the elite perspective represents one of the several attempts to subject ethnici-
ty to universal and scientific frameworks of analysis. This, in part, explains the
popularity of the perspective.
This paper is a critical examination of this popular perspective. As I see it, the
controversy which the adherents of the elite perspective have succeeded in raising,
and which is likely to remain for a long time to come, is whether ethnicity is unreal
(which is what its conception as an "ideology" suggests)t2) or, at best. real only to
the extent that it is elite-directed. Such points of view may be self-evidently convin-
cing. but I am persuaded that their reductionist character oversimplifies ethnic
analysis and the problems posed by ethnicity itself. These are some of the points I
raise in this paper from a largely African framework. The elite perpectitive of
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ethnicity has been applied mostly to the African situation where concrete class
structures are in the process of coming into being but have been distorted so far
because of fragmentation introduced by ethnicity and other cleavages.
ETHNICITY: WHAT IS IT?
Although scholars differ on how best to define and characterise ethnicity because
it is a relatively new concept for which comparative utility is stilI being sought,(3)
there is general agreement on a few points which are germane to understanding the
phenomenon. First, it is agreed that though ethnicity is a derivative of the ethnic
group, it only occurs in situations involving more than one ethnic group or identity
with a clear "us" and "they" differentiation. Second, to fully grasp the meaning of
ethnicity, one has to start with defining and identifying the ethnic groups actually
involved. This is particularly important because of the systemic differences in the
definition of ethnicity (and ethnic group) across societies (Porter, 1975; Burgess,
1978; Mckay, 1982; Osaghae, 1989). Third, ethnicity is a problematic
phenomenon whose character is conflictual rather than consensual. In fact. it has
been found to be positively correlated with political instability (cf. Cox, 1970; Bar-
rows, 1976).(4) Finally, it is agreed that no matter the level of development, ethnici-
ty is a political force in every society that is not monoethnic (Glazer & rvIoynihan,
1975; Nagata, 1976; Smith, 1981). It is for this reason that students of ethnicity
have searched for universal theoretical perspectives for ethnic analysis. The elite
perspective which I examine in this paper is one of the fruits of this search.
Having enumerated the features of ethnicity on which scholars agree, let us now
see what ethnicity really is. It may be defined as a conscious behaviour based on
ethnic identity or loyalty in a competitive situation involving more than one such
identity, which is aimed at furthering the interests of the individual and/or his
group. In political terms, it refers to the ethnic-identity based behaviour which
seeks. in a competitive setting, to capture political power (at the micro level) and
state power (at the macro level). Thus defined, it is clear that even though ethnicity
is a derivative of ethnic pluralism, ethnic pluralism by itself does not lead to ethnici-
ty. The etiology of ethnicity-its why and how-is an adjunct of its definition. At
the same time, because ethnic pluralism became a necessary condition for its ex-
istence; the definition of the ethnic group is also an integral part of defining ethnici-
ty. It is this latter definition that I shall consider first because it is the building
block of ethnicity.
Depending on a researcher's objective, an ethnic group may be defined with a
behavioural or non-behavioural emphasis. The non-behavioural emphasis
dominated anthropological studies for a long time, and involved the conception of
ethnic groups as "tribes" which were isolated and marked by objective diacritic like
language, culture, territory and political organisation. In the words of Van den
Berghe (1974: 121): "To the Western anthropological tradition, ethnicity was an in-
ventory of culture traits divorced of its political and economic structure." Barth's
(1969) epochal work on the dynamic character of ethnic groups and, especially, of
their boundaries. broke this anthropological tradition and drew attention to the
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behavioural component of the ethnic group. The behavioural emphasis, on the
other hand, has to do with the definition of the ethnic group in highly subjective
terms as focus for the identification, loyalty and behavior of its members. In the
final analysis however, ethnic groups cannot be defined by a behavioural or non-
behavioural emphasis, but as a composite of both. If nothing else, an ethnic identi-
ty cannot be assumed if there are no (objective) identifiers. Recognising this, I find
the 'composite' definition offered by Kasfir (1976) quite appropriate: An ethnic
group is the product of (I) a number of underlying objective characteristics
associated with common descent like language and common culture; (2) which con-
stitute the basis of identity as defined by 'insiders' who belong to the group and
'outsiders' who do not belong to the group but identify it as different from their
own groups; (3) which generally become the basis for mobilising group con-
sciousness and solidarity, and which, (4) in certain situations, result in political ac-
tivity.
The other aspect of defining ethnicity is to account for its salience or existence.
As I have pointed out, ethnic pluralism is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for ethnicity. The sufficient condition is that ethnic differences are mobilised and
manipulated in pursuance of personal or group interests. and this is what the
etiology of ethnicity seeks to explain. The point of departure in considering the
etiology is to emphasise the situational character of ethnicity. It is not true that all
political relations in multiethnic politics are obdurately or pervasively ethnic, as
assumed a long time ago by some theorists (Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972; Lever,
1979; Van Amersfoort & Van der Wusten, 1981). Rather, ethnicity is a situational
phenomenon depending on the issues at stake in a particular situation and the iden-
tities assumed by the actors. Its salience also varies in degrees from one situation
to another, again depending on the stakes involved (Weingrod, 1979; Okamura,
1981; Chazan, 1982; Cohen, 1974). Thus, it is latent in some situations and
manifest in others or, in some, mild and in others' violent. As Cohen (1974;
14-15) puts it, "We must remember that ethnicity is a matter of degree. There is
ethnicity and ethnicity. The constraint that custom exercises on the individual
varies from case to case.... In some situations, it leads to violence and bloodshed. ,.
Even so. Enloe (1980: 6) warns that "the outside observer should not mistake low
saliency for the disappearance of ethnic conciousness altogether. The unmobilised
ethnic group is an ethnic group in hibernation. If conditions pose opportunities or
threats for which ethnic ties are germane, ethnicity may once again take on vitality
and political significance."
The full implication of the situational conception of ethnicity is that it is a con-
scious, voluntary, functional and rational form of behaviour which is calculated to
bring about desired ends in situations where it is adopted. Or, as Patterson (1975)
would say, ethnicity is a "rational strategy" chosen to advance the interest of the in-
dividual as the situation dictates. Again, this contradicts an earlier popular notion
that ethnicity is an involuntary mode of behaviour which flows from the "givens"
of life as a result of a "spiritual affinity" which binds members of a primordial
group (Geertz, 1963; Isaacs 1975).(5) This notion has been rejected for its
psychological reductionism, disregard for the political and economic milieu of
ethnicity, and its inability to account for the changing character of ethnicity under
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social change. However, some unrepentant Western scholars characterise ethnicity
in Africa in such morbid terms (Gans, 1979; Isaacs, 1975).
Concern with explaining the salience of ethnicity-its sudden rise to prominence
as well as its sudden, even if temporary, disappearance--is relatively recent. It us-
ed to be thought that ethnicity was a "natural" phenomenon whose only explana-
tion lay in the fact of its being innate to the individual's sense of belonging and
pride. Scholars did not even need to bother too much about ethnicity because it
was only to be found in backward societies, and was expected to wither away with
modernisation. Two developments however combined to expose the wrongness of
this view. First, contrary to expectations, the modernisation process did not result
in ., detribalisation" (the expectation was that ethnicity being "non-rational" will
easily give way to rational forms of behaviour based on class and party ties as
modernisation progressed). Instead, it seems to have had the opposite effect,
rekindling long dormant 'primordial' loyalties and fostering the dismemberment
of established states, rather than promoting their integration. The second was the
more recent finding that ethnicity is situational and the implication of this-the
need to explain the fluid and intermittent character of ethnicity. Both contem-
poraneous developments indicated that. without denying its independent force,
ethnicity should be treated as a dependent variable if it is to be fully understood.
This is the backdrop of several schools in the etiology of ethnicity.
There are several perspectives which explain ethnicity. These include the scarce
resources perspective, the social change/adaptive mechanism school, the Marxist
perspective, the neo-Marxist perspective and, of course, the elite perspective.(6) As
I indicated at the beginning of this paper, the elite perspective, which is my major
concern, is one of the most popular of these perspectives. One reason for this is
that its major assumptions bestride the other perspectives.!?) In what follows in
this paper we shall examine the thesis of the elite perspective, and, in the light of its
applicability to the African situation, attempt a critique of the perspective.
THE ELITE PERSPECTIVE
The point to begin with is to distinguish between the elite perspective and the
class perspective. Some authors take elite and class to mean one and the same
thing (Markovitz, 1977). For others who accept the radical-liberal distinctions in
the usage of these terms, a class is a highly self-conscious, economically determined
group of people who share common (class) interests, while an elite is a group (or
category) of people who occupy leading and directing roles in society which are not
necessarily economically determined and whose members do not necessarily share
common (class) interests (Brass, 1985). A further distinction is that while an elite
is by definition a privileged minority, a class could either be privileged or unprivileg-
ed. In relation to ethnicity however, these distinctions become blurred as both the
elite and class perspectives hold that ethnicity is an ideology employed by the
privileged members of society (elite, class) to further their constitutive interests.
But even so, the elite perspective offers a wider scope for ethnic analysis than does
the class perspective which, in strict terms, takes ethnic analysis and class analysis
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to be mutually exclusive, and posits that class analysis is more realistic than ethnic
analysis and, hence, superior to it (Magubane, 1969: 538).(8) The elite perspective,
on the other hand. does not run into this "fallacy of objectification (Brass, 1985;
II)" because it does not insist that class is more real than the ethnic group. Rather,
it seeks to integrate "class" and ethnic analyses by positing that ethnicity is an
ideology employed by the privileged members of a society in their competition for
the society's resources, especially power. True, there are variants of class analysis
in which this position is upheld (Skler, 1967), but such "liberal" class analysis lacks
the punch of pure Marxist analysis. To avoid any conceptual confusion as we go
on, I should emphasise the point that "elite" as used in the elite perspective of
ethnicity is not meant to be a substitute for class but to refer to formations within
ethnic groups and classes that often play critical roles in ethnic mobilisation.
In spite of these distinctions, the major thesis of the elite perspective is quite
similar to that of Marxist class analysts who give a place to ethnicity in their
analysis. The thesis is that ethnicity is epiphenomenal, as its existence is a function
of the manipulations of the masses by the elite or privileged class. In other words,
ethnicity should be analysed, within the framework of a "sociology of dependence
(Van den Berghe, 1974)," as a dependent variable rather than a principal political
force. This implies I) that ethnicity is not an ideology of the masses who do not
manipulate others (not even themselves); 2) that ethnicity will lose its political
salience if the elites reach a consensus, or if they transform themselves from being
a class-in-itself to a class-for-itself; and 3) that ethnicity is more a political
phenomenon than a cultural one. These are some of the issues I address later.
Let us now dwell on the elite perspective. We shall begin by defining the term
elite. According to Pareto (1968: 8), "Elite should be treated as a value free term,
meaning those who score highest on scales measuring any social value or commodi-
ty (utility) such as power, riches, knowledge." Bottomore (1976: 14) has also writ-
ten that "The term 'elite(s)' is now generally applied in fact, to functional, mainly
occupational, groups which have high status (for whatever reason) in a society.... "
Elite then, is usually defined in relation to the non-elite and is composed of those
who occupy leading positions and roles in all facets of society-the political
leaders, top civil servants and bureaucrats, top military officers and academicians,
leading professionals, businessmen and other top members of the merchant class.
Hopkins (1971) for example, identifies the Tanzanian elite as comprising members
of the national legislative assembly. government administrators and top ranking
people in business, labour, education and the military, though he excluded the
non-government elite because of their large non-Tanzanian composition.
These privileged members of society provide leadership and are the main
aspirants to, and competitors for, political power and privileges. It is for these
reasons that Mosca (1939) describes the elite as the ruling class which is .. always the
less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolises power, and enjoys the
advantages that power brings," and the non-elite as "the more numerous
class" which is .. directed and controlled" by the elite. The tools of control and
manipulation have been variously called political formula (Mosca), derivation
(Pareto), myth or ideology and usually consist of "a set of general moral and
political principles which the society at large will be prepared to acknowledge as
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having universal validity" but actually aims at furthering the selfish interests of the
elites (Parry, 1980: 56). To complete the definition of elite 1should add that just as
there are different sectors and segments in society, so are there different elites. We
can classify these elites according to the criterion germane to our interest, accor-
ding to subsystems (e. g. political elite and economic elite), cleavages (ethnic elite,
religious elite) or according to class (e. g. working class elite). This point of the
heterogeneity of the elite is very important for our analysis as 1 shall show shortly.
The elite perspective, in general, rests on the assumption that society is elite-
directed, and that elite-challenging acts are symptomatic of a malfunctioning socie-
ty (Inglehart, 1983).(9) Since Plato and Aristotle,oO) elite theorists have continued
to emphasise the reality-creating functions and vanguardist role of the elite in society.
It is the elite that moves society and makes its history. The elite mode of analysis in-
volves accounting for how the elite does this. There are two models of elite
analysis. The first, which I shall call the hegemonic model assumes a class-for-
itself elite which is a closeknit minority that acts on a single impulse which is the col-
lective interest of the members. The second model, which I call the pluralist
model, sees the elite as consisting of diverse organised minorities obeying diffuse
and often conflicting impulses. Writing from a perspective of democratic
pluralism which assumes elite plurality, Bachrach (1967: 16) says the major distinc-
tion between the two models is that "the emphasis shifts from manipulation and ex-
ploitation of the masses by the elite [in the hegemonic model] to the limitation and
control of elites within the ruling class by the alignment of differing political forces
in separate and opposing political institutions." A much more important distinc-
tion for our purpose is that while the hegemonic model emphasises elite cohesion
(consensus), the pluralistic model emphasises the competitive (conflictual) aspects
of inter-elite relations. The latter model informs the elite perspective of ethnicity
which is our concern in this paper. I should add however, that whenever the elite
are found, they are assumed to possess group consciousness, coherence and self-
perpetuating will. (II) "If the group does not act as a unified body," Parry (1980:
32) has \"Titten, "it is less an elite than a category of 'top persons' in the particular
sphere in question."
There are several ways to categorise the elites or elite groups in society. One
popular way is to classify them according to the major institutions in society
(Hewitt, 1981). So we have the political elite. social elite, economic elite. tradi-
tional elite, military elite, bureaucratic elite and so on, depending on how general
or specific we want to be. Inter-elite competition within this framework involves
inter-sectoral struggle such as found in the now less popular thesis that military in-
tervention in the new states results from the struggle for power between the
bureaucratic elite and the military elite. Another classificatory scheme ranks elites
in order of position, influence and power-governing elite, non-governing elite.
top elite, who's who elite, etc.-and sees inter-elite competition in terms of inter-
rank struggles (Deutsch, 1974; Pareto, 1935; Mosca, 1939). A third way to classify
elites, which is the one adopted in this paper sees the elites as divided according to
the cleavages which exist in society. These cleavages are basically those described
by Geertz (1963) as the .. givens" of lif~blood and kinship ties, ethnic group,
region, religion, and caste. Every group that had differentiated according to the
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relevant cleavage has its elite who, in competition with elites from other groups, ex-
ploit these differences by mobilising ethnic loyalties to further their interests:
"When elite in conflict come from different cultural, linguistic or religious groups,
the symbolic resources used (in their struggle or competition) will emphasise those
differences (Brass, 1985: 30). "(12) This is the basic gist of the conception of ethnici-
ty as an ideology of inter-elite competition. The conception holds that"ethnicity
entails the activation of the cultural markers of a group, which may be primordial-
ly rooted, by political elites to mobilise ethnic-based support in their conflict with
other similarly placed elites under conditions of incorporation of the group into a
larger sociopolitical unit or of competition for scarce and valued societal resources
(Mozaffar, 1986: 4)."
Central to the inter-elite competition thesis of ethnicity, as to most other schools
of ethnogenesis, is the assumption that ethnicity does not assume political salience
except when it is articulated and manipulated by privileged members of society, the
main aspirants to and competitors for power. to further their interests. To this ex-
tent. Brass (1985: 12) defines the elites as "leadership segments with concrete
characteristics and statuses, whose actions are critical in determining whether or
not such categoric groups as ...ethnic communities will be mobilised for political
purposes." The elites are aided in this process by the marked inequalities which ex-
ist among the groups in terms of development and opportunities of development.
This makes their task easier because, in the name of bettering the lot of the group
and/or catching up with others, the elites succeed in recruiting the masses by pro-
moting the elite interest as the common interest. Indeed, adherents of the scarce
resources school of ethnicity posit that ethnicity would not become a political force
except when people find themselves subject to "structural inequalities" and
perceive political and economic gains as a reward for political mobilisation along
ethnic lines (Cross, 1977: Young. 1976). This is especially true of African and
other third world states where the state dominates the economic sphere and is, as
such. the coveted prize of all political competition. As one author puts it, "So im-
portant have been the rewards of controlling the state as a means of determining
the allocation of economic and social resources that the fear of political exclusion
held by minority ethnic groups has resulted in severe ethnic tensions. Loss of con-
trol of the Central government does not simply mean a period in the political
wilderness. it spells total economic disaster (Stone, 1983: 90)."
Another reason why the elites find ethnicity an expedient ideology is. as neo-
Marxist scholars of the internal colonialist genre argue. that in the modern
(capitalist) state. ethnic struggles are more pervasive and dangerous than are class
struggles. Consequently. the state is generally more responsive to ethnic than to
class pressures (McRoberts, 1979: Wallerstein, 1979). According to Wallerstein
(1979: 187), the capitalist world economy and imperialist state expension have led
to uneven distribution of state resources and valued employment opportunities
among ethnic groups. Therefore, Wallerstein concludes, the essence of the
modern state is not its relative autonomy, but its role as a distributor of resources
unequally among ethnic groups. The discriminatory consequences of this heighten
ethnic tensions especially on the part of disadvantaged, 'backward', or 'oppressed'
groups. This partly explains why elite accommodation models such as consocia-
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tional democracy and distributive policies such as reverse or protective discrimina-
tion, affirmative action, quota system, federal character and so on heighten ethnic
conflicts rather than pacify them especially at the initial stages. (3)
We shall conclude this section of the paper by looking at two critical assump-
tions which underlie the elite perspective of ethnicity. First, as in most other
variants of elite theory, there is an implicit assumption that the elite in every ethnic
group is more self conscious and organised than the masses and is therefore able to
mobilise and lead the ethnic community. In Mrica where the masses are illiterate,
apathetic and passive, this assumption has more than a conceptual significance. Se-
cond, the elite thesis will be meaningless unless we also assume that the ethnic
group functions like a formal or informal interest group. In making this assump-
tion cognisance is taken of the analytical problems posed by the conception of
ethnic groups as interest groups (Brass, 1985: 10-11) as well as the fact that if the in-
terest group approach were to be strictly followed, many ethnic groups will not
qualify to be called groups at all. But, at the same time, superior organisational
skills cannot be assumed on the part of the elites without a prior assumption that
the ethnic group is an interest group with recognisable goals (defined by the
elites). Indeed, if we look closely, we see that politically relevant ethnic com-
munities are the organised groups. In Mrica the famous "tribal" progressive
unions as well as ethnic political parties quickly come to mind. In whatever way
one looks at it, this organisational assumption is important because it gives ethnici-
ty a basis.
THE ELITE PERSPECTIVE IN THE AFRICAN SITUATION
The elite perspective in general, and the ethnic version of it in particular, is
believed to be most applicable to the situation in Africa and the third world where
class structures are yet to solidify and where the vast majority of the peoples are il-
literate and unaware. This makes it easy for the elite to manipulate them. The ap-
plicability and appropriateness of the ideological conception of ethnicity to the
inter-elite competition are strengthened by the fact that the elite in individual
African states is fragmented along ethnic lines, a fact which partly explains the
failure of a hegemonic national elite to emerge. The only hegemonic elites are sec-
tional (ethnic, religious, regional, etc.) elites such as the Northern Nigeria elite
described by Ekeh (1989).
The fragmentation and sectionalisation of the elite in Africa are popularly at-
tributed to the divide et impera policies of the various colonial authorities. It is a
mark of this that the most pronounced (elite) ethnic dissension is to be found in ex-
British territories like Nigeria where this policy was pursued most. There is little
merit in pointing out that the elite which were cut off from the masses by their
Western education were nurtured and fostered, even created, by the colonial
regime mainly to serve the needs of the regime (Ake, 1981). One of these needs was
the discouragement of national cohesion, to lay the grounds for neo-colonial con-
trol afrer independence. Granted that this was the fatal legacy of colonialism. I
think the point which authors have not sufficiently emphasised is that, ostensibly as
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part of their collaborative disposition towards the colonialists, the elites found the
legacy expedient.
True indeed, the colonial authors instigated and in some cases, administratively
created ethnic groups as we know them today (Apthorpe, 1968). The British
authorities, for one, devoted time to labeling and classifying ethnic groups and this
strengthened and sharpened ethnic differences. In Uganda, through this classifica-
tion strategy, the British generalised and expanded the Ankole community by exten-
ding the authority of the pre-colonial state over many other principalities. Similar
cases are seen in Buganda and Bunyoro (Segal & Doornbos, 1976) and the
Hausa/Fulani in Nigeria. By contrast, in some other places, pre-colonial spheres
of influence were reduced and new ethnic identities were thereby given expression.
A case in point is the old Benin empire which was reduced to Benin-city, thereby
freeing the Esan, Ivbiasako, lka and others and foisting 'new' ethnic identities on
them, complete with administrative territories.
In spite of the 'havoc' wreaked by the colonial authorities, the point that should
be emphasised is that the elites were not averse to the ethnic infrastructure and, in
fact, they did much to instigate ethnic consciousness. foster 'internal' ethnic unity,
and create 'modern' ethnic groups as we know them today. The major tools they
employed in this process of were three. First, capitalising on the works already
done by missionary groups and colonial administrators in standardising vernacular
languages, the elite foisted common languages which brought together groups with
close dialects.(14) Until today, language remains the major ethnic diacritic in Africa
(Nnoli, 1978). Second, they seized on extant myths or invented, fabricated, or
manipulated through generalisation, myths of common descent or what Nagata
(1976: 244) calls "charter myths" to foster common destinies for peoples who could
lay no claim to actual kinship relations. (15) The Oduduwa myth (Yoruba) and the
Bayajidda legend (Hausa) are examples of such charter myths. The Oduduwa
myth was the main point in the effort by Egbe Omo Oduduwa to foster Yoruba uni-
ty (Arifalo, 1986). Finally, the elites cashed in on the slightest opportunities to an-
tagonise rival outgroups, thereby sharpening ethnic consciousness and differentia-
tion-the 'us' vs 'they' .(6) This completed the process of ethnicisation.
These facts have led Ekeh (1975: 105) to conclude that "ideologies and myths do
have reality-creating functions, and the corporate character now attributed to the
various ethnic groups is the reality that flowed from the ideoligies and myths in-
vented by the bourgeoisie to consolidate their parcels of influence." Taken literal-
ly, the notion of "reality-creating" formation implies that present-day ethnicity
and ethnic groups may just be unreal or, at best, categories which did not previous-
ly exist. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Elsewhere, I have debunked
that part of this proposition which suggests that present-day ethnic groups and rela-
tions are simply new creations-whether of the elites (Ekeh) or the colonisers (Ap-
thorpe)-by demonstrating that they are, in their present forms, products of the
continuities and changes primordial groups have undergone from and through pre-
colonial and colonial times to the present social formations (Osaghae, 1989). I
funher emphasised that no matter how much ethnic groups and relations may have
been fabricated, refurbished and manipulated (by the elites) to meet present needs
and fit present circumstances, the depth of their origins and development has too
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often been underestimated by the over-emphasis on the vanguardist role of the
elite.
H the reality-creating role of the elite is not over-stated or over-simplified, no
serious damage is done to the argument that it was the elites who were the com-
petitors for the privileges and opportunities offered by the 'modernisation' of
society especially for top government positions that propelled ethnic political
behaviour.(7) This is especially true of, and has become more acute in, the
postcolonial period when the state and its control have become the raison d'etre of
all political competition. As a demonstration of the applicability of the elite
perspective to the African situation, let us examine two aspects of the competition
for power and resources to which the perspective has been popularly applied.
The first is in the area of party politics and elections. Analyses of party politics
and elections in Africa which do not emphasise their ethnic character are quite
rare. In virtually all cases, the directing role of the elite is emphasised (Kasfir,
1976). The formation of political parties and campaigns for elections, Dudley
(1973: 33) affirms, "entailed creating a political self from the social identity which
inclusion in the membership of the particular culture area offered and. to do this,
the educated elite had to draw on the language of primordialism and communal
parochialism for the terms of political discourse." In relation to electoral
behaviour, the most popular thesis is that the individual votes as a member of an
ethnic community whose party choice is determined. not by pre-existing cleavages
and sentiments, but by competition among rival elites of the groups (Post. 1963;
Vincent, 1971; Leys, 1975; Cohen, 1979; LaFontaine, 1965; Austin, 1961). As
class ties are fragile, the political elite holds on tightly to the ethnic strategy as their
major qualification for laying a claim to power. Their position is aptly borne out
by Awolowo's insistence on the utility of ethnic leadership: "I pity the ignorance of
those who believe that I can become a leader of Nigeria only if I renounce my
leadership of the Yorubas. I could not become a leader of the country if I were re-
jected by those among whom I was born. What would be my credentials for ruling
the whole country if I failed with a small group? (Awolowo, 1981)."
The second aspect is appointments to top government positions. Largely
because of the centrality of the state-as the "means of production" and allocator
of desired benefits and privileges-competition for top goverment positions as well
as the favour of the government is very fierce among the elite. They lack a material
base which they depend on the goodwill of the state to get and, without this base,
they cannot maintain the patron-client relationships which sustain their privileged
positions. The government is therefore the centre piece of their competition. In
this competition, elites from disadvantaged groups have alleged domination,
discrimination and oppression on the part of the more advantaged groups and
have struggled to remain privileged. It is the awareness that the elite cannot main-
tain their positions if they are not guaranteed access to state power that has led to a
regulation of this competition through rules of the game embodied in various
ethnic arithmetic formulas. One example is the federal character principle in
Nigeria \vhich Dudley (1982: 62) asserts was devised to ameliorate inter-elite
acrimony over top government positions which heightened political instability in
the past.
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It is clear enough that the elite perspective of ethnicity provides a useful
framework for analysing ethnic relations in Africa. Its major point is that it ex-
poses the actual worshippers of the idol of ethnicity. The perspective does not
assume as do some others (plural society, for example) that ethnicity is sui
generis. It further makes the important point that since ethnic and class relations
and conflicts are usually geared towards the same ends, it will be partial and inade-
quate analysis to ignore or underestimate the role of class forces in ethnicity. In
practical terms, for the most part, class and ethnic forces intersect and are mutual-
ly reinforcing. This is what informs Gordon's (1964) "ethclass" approach to ethnic
analysis.(IS) So, we ought not to underestimate the class context of ethnicity or the
ethnic context of class, although "The tendency among Marxists to read class in-
terest behind ethnic movements is far more common than any tendency among
ethnic analysts to read ethnic sentiments behind class movements (Brass, 1985:
13)." While acknowledging this point, the suggestion that ethnic analysis is simply
incidental to class (or, for that matter, elite) analysis, should be rejected because
"to the extent that a society is divided into both ethnic groups and into classes,
neither of the two kinds of groups can be reduced to the other. Ethnicity is not
simply a minor complication or special case of class, nor can ethnicity be
understood outside the total context of inequalities which includes class (Van den
Berghe, 1974: 123)."
This is a convenient point at which to begin a critique of the elite perspective of
ethnicity because there is a suggestion that, outside of the elite framework, ethnici-
ty will not exist or will be unreal. Is this the case?
IS ETHNICITY (ONLY) AN IDEOLOGY OF INTER-ELITE COMPETITION?
The answer is an emphatic no because ethnicity is much more than an ideology
of inter-elite competition. Let us begin by rejecting, in its entirety, an insinuation
that if ethnicity is not an elite-begotten ideology, its correlates are negative: 1) that
ethnicity lacks relative autonomy and is therefore a wholly dependent variable, and
2) that ethnicity cannot be a non-elite or elite-challenging phenomenon. These
views are highly distorted and misleading. First, while it is possible for the
linguistic and cultural aspects of ethnicity to be overshadowed by the political and
economic conflicts based on them, it is not true that they do not sui generis result in
ethnic conflicts (and these, not necessarily directed by the elites). In the USSR, the
problem of the" national question" involves the integration of linguistic minorities
(Farberov, 1980). In Canada and Belgium, language competition has been one of
the main grounds of ethnic mobilisation (Lieberson, 1970; Olsak, 1982). A similar
situation exists in India (Das Gupta, 1970) while in the USA, ethnic diacritic re-
main crucial (Gans, 1979). In Africa where ethnicity retains a highly primordial
character, it is relatively autonomous in aspects like culture, language, territory
and other markers which permeate class and other group structures. Above all,
ethnocentricism or pride in one's ethnic identity remains one of the propelling
forces in ethnic conflicts. Indeed, for most Africans, the ethnic community is the
only real entity worth dying for, and this fact is emphasised in folktales, songs and
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cultural practices. In many cases. ethnic boundaries have been defended largely on
the grounds of group pride.
The point in all this, of course, is that there are ethnic residues that do not de-
pend on class configuration. In fact, in many cases, class divisions are explicable
in terms of these residues. The well known inability of the classes in Africa, both
at the level of the elites and the masses, to unify themselves, is a case in point. Pan
of the explanation for this, Otite (1979: 93) avers, lies in "the attachment to the ex-
clusive symbols of ethnicity (which) weakens class cultures as well as elite organisa-
tion and occupational colleagueship." In view of this, it is more accurate to say
that ethnicity is both a dependent and an independent variable, depending on what
aspects of it one is interested in.
The second suggestion that ethnicity is not employed by the non-elites is also ob-
jectionable. In the developed world represented by the USA, if Gans (1979) is to
be believed, ethnicity is a working class ideology because it is at this level that most
Americans suffer deprivations and inequalities. One implication of this claim
would be that, in the long run, after the positions of the elite are consolidated with
a material base in Africa and a full-fledged bourgeoisie emerges, ethnicity will
become less of an elite-begotten ideology.(l9) But, we do not even need to wait for
the long-run to know that ethnicity is an ideology of both inter-elite and inter-non-
elite competition. This has to be so if we accept that the ethnic strategy is always
there to be used and, because it is not necessary for all members to agree on how to
use it before it is put to use. its use is not restricted to the elites. Any member of
the group-elite or non-elite-can employ it, depending on the situation in which
he finds himself.
The findings of a recent research undertaken by this author in selected Nigerian
towns lend ample support to this argument. One such finding is that although the
famous ethnic (tribal) unions remain the corner stone of ethnicity in the towns,
they are mostly organised by the masses who have proven to be more enthusiastic
about preserving the ethnic interests especially in the areas of culture and
language. It may be argued that even among these mass groups, there are clear
leaders who constitute the "elite" and who may in fact manipulate the group to fur-
ther their own interests. Such an argument is partly valid if we restrict the meaning
of the term elites to only leaders. But even so, we know who the elites are in
African societies: they are distinct and set apart from the masses mainly by their
Western education, but also by their wealth, reputation, influence, connections
with, and control of, government and its agencies. and so on. It is a mark of this
elite distinction that side-by-side with the mass-organised ethnic unions, the elites
have in most cases organised their own, more select ethnic "thought" groups \vhich
ostensibly pursue "nobler" ethnic interests.(20) For obvious reasons, it is the in-
tellectual ethnic think-tank that constitutes the recruitment ground for appoint-
ment to top government positions and the awards of major contracts. But where
such elite associations do not exist or prove inadequate to meet the elite needs, they
have never failed to turn into the mass and its larger-organised ethnic unions.
The point I am making is that it would seem that the masses have recognised the
interests the ethnic ideology can serve for them, different from those of the elite.
They have also used the ethnic ideology towards these ends. My research further
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showed why the non-elites find the ethnic strategy convenient. First, the urban
masses in most Nigerian towns have more acute senses of ethnic differentiation and
stereotypes than the elites (and it does not matter if they are simply living upon the
foundation laid by the elites).(21) For example, non-elite parents are more likely to
refuse the marriage of their children to partners from other groups than elite
parents are. Second, being poor, unprivileged and deprived, urban non-elites find
the ethnic connection a necessary condition for getting a job, a contract or promo-
tion. For others, it is a convenient rationalisation for failure (Ayoade, 1983).
The elite perspective of ethnicity finally suffers from two serious conceptual
defects which limit its empirical applicability. In the first place, the perspective
underplays the situational character of ethnicity and the fact that it is a highly in-
dividualised form of political behaviour that depends on the particular situation.
especially the behaviour of others. The approach emphasises the macro or group
level of ethnicity to the detriment of the micro or I (and possibly we) level which,
adherents of the situational school argue, is the more relevant framework for
understanding ethnicity. On the balance, ethnicity is both a micro and a macro
phenomenon and either of the two comes into play depending on the particular
situation. If these points are well taken, it is easy to see that, since every actor in
politics is assumed to be rational (of course this is central to the elite perspective),
the ethnic ideology can be employed by anyon~lite and non-elite alike-as the
situation dictates.
The second defect is closely related to the first, but it is more devastating. It is
that the perspective treats the ethnic group as a homogeneous entity which unques-
tionably accepts the leadership of the elite and rises in support of it anytime the
members are mobilised. This analytical error is made because the elite perspective
fails to examine intra-group relations as an integral part of inter-group relations.
In consequence, the elite perspective is unable "to deal with, or even comprehend,
let alone predict, the ebb and flow of ethnicity...among particular peoples at
different times, and the sometimes dramatic shifts in ethnic group identification
(Brass, 1985: 31)." Mozaffar is more exact: because it ignores intra-group rela-
tions, the elite perspective fails to see that" ethnic groups in Africa are not internal-
ly cohesive social categories, but are differentiated along, and overlap with, various
other lines of social cleavages such as age, class. education, etc. (Mosaffar. 1986:
8)." 1 have already referred to the situation in some Nigerian towns where ethnic
groups are divided along elite-non-elite lines. If one does not undertake intra-
group analysis, one would be misled into thinking that only the elites are the
spokespersons of the groups. Apart from the fact that some members of the non-
elite groups are bold enough to challenge the pretensions to leadership on the pan
of the part of the elites, there are a variety of reasons why elites in Africa do not
necessarily lead their groups, even in political matters. These include: 1) some of
the discerning non-elites recognise the self-serving ends of elite-begotten ethnic
ideology, and challenge the leadership of the elite; 2) there are usually traditional
or cultural procedures which may mitigate the influence of the elites on grounds of
age, sex, family, secret society membership, and the like; and 3) the group may be
divided according to wards, clans, villages, class or religion. thereby preventing a
monolithic elite leadership.
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So, the fact that the elites are, or are assumed to be, "the worst peddlars" of
ethnicity does not make them the leaders of the ethnic group, nor does the fact that
they are privileged and possess the most superior organisational skills. We have to
find out how they relate with the rest of the group. Otherwise, we may actually be
talking of ethnic leaders without ethnic constituencies.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, I have tried to argue that ethnicity is much more than an
"ideology" (because it is real) or an elite affair (because it can be employed by any
man acting rationally as the situation dictates). The elite perspective certainly is an
important, even if partial, perspective of ethnic analysis, especially because it at-
tempts to integrate class and ethnic analyses. But we must be careful not to fall in-
to the fallacy of objectification, Le. the assumption that ethnicity is unreal. As one
leading author on ethnicity wrote a fairly long time ago: " ... if one avoids an im-
plicit and class analysis of ethnicity on the grounds that ethnicity is too often a con-
coction of manipulative elites, then of course one cannot fully comprehend under
what conditions and for how long such a mode of control may persist. Failure to
understand that seems to carry with it a far greater analytical danger than risking
falling into an elite's conceptual framework. Ethnic categorisations have served
political elites well, precisely when they have struck some vital nerves in a given col-
lectivity. To contend that ethnicity is a potentially manipulative tool is not to say
that it is 'unreal' (Enloe, 1978: 337-38),"
There is always the danger of saying so in an unqualified application of the elite
perspective to ethnicity. Therefore, it should be applied along with other perspec-
tives of ethnicity, particularly those which acknowledge elite-challenging ethnicity.
to expand its analytical spectrum and increase its empirical applicability.
NOTES
(1) Most authors at the time even went ahead to distinguish between ethnicity which was
supposedly a modern phenomenon and .. tribalism" which was the hallmark of
backward societies. Such perjorative connotations have featured less in recent
writings, although some amhors still insist that "African ethnicity" belongs to a special
category of primordialism. Enloe (1973) refers to African ethnicity as "tribal ethnicity."
(2) Actually, elite theorists believe that an "ideology" is the name of the tool or strategy
employed by the elites to manipulate the masses. Ideology has also been called "for-
mula," "myth," and "derivation" (Bottomore, 1976: 7-20).
(3) What I mean is that much of the theoretical developments in the study of ethnicity is
devoted to formulating paradigms of cross-cultural research notwithstanding the
cultural peculiarities of ethnicity in individual cases. The problem in this, however, is
that there is always the danger of underestimating the systemic factors which make
ethnicity peculiar in each case. So, much as the across-the-board development is
desirable, we should not fail to also look at the intra-system variables.
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(4) Some authors do not, however, accept this view. Paul Mercier. one of such authors
argues that "In the new states, ethnic identity does not always have a centrifugal effect;
it can just as well be an integrative factor to the extent that the rules of a common game
are explicitly or implicitly accepted. Ethnic identity can. in many different ways, con-
tribute to unification or be utilised toward that end (Mercier, 1965: 486)." Unfortunate-
ly, Mercier does not tell us the ways in which this can be done.
(5) Geertz wrote within the modernisation framework, and argued that these .. givens"
were more problematic in the new states, where they impeded the success of the in-
tegrative revolution, than in the old states. This erroneous impression has been
challenged by the many instances of unsuccessful integrative revolution in some of the
so-called advanced states like Belgium, Canada and North Ireland.
(6) A good analysis of these perspectives can be found in Kasfir (1976) and McKay (1982).
(7) For example, holders of most of the other perspectives believe that ethnicity is mobilis-
ed by the" men of power '. to further their interests.
(8) In fact, Magubane (1969: 538) has argued that focus on ethnicity beclouds any serious
effort to understand African societies because it ignores ownership of the primary pro-
ductive forces, the material hase of society and the nature of the social system. In a
similar vein, Mafeje (1971: 253-55) argues that ethnicity 'oversimplifies' and 'obscures'
the real nature of economic and power relations among Africans themselves. and bet-
ween them and the capitalist world.
(9) lnglehart (1983) defines "elite-directed" political behaviour as involving the mobilisa-
tion of the (mass) publics by the elites through various manipulative mechanisms, in
pursuit of goals chosen by them and in their interest. "Elite-challenging" behaviour by
contrast, is a "bottom-up behavioural pattern which is mass-based and mass-led and
directly challenges the goals of the elites.
(10) Plato and Aristotle wrote about the "guardians" and the "philosopher-kings" who
were specially endowed with the art of ruling.
(II) In other words, every ethnic elite is assumed to be committed to promoting the collec-
tive interests of the minority group.
(12) He adds that this usually happens "when elites in conflict lack the bureaucratic ap-
paratus or the instruments of violence to compete effectively......
(13) This is usually because of the marked inequalities among the groups.
(14) As Ekeh (1975: 105) puts it, "Even the languages by which some claim to identify the
ethnic group in (the) modern day...are, to a large extent, a product of (the) domain-
partition ideology [of the elites]."
(15) According to Nagata (1976: 244), .. ethnic categories or groups, irrespective of the objec-
tive conditions, which gave them birth, eventually come to generate myths of common
origin...which function as a charter myth for their current existence, unity and com-
mon interests in much the same way that genealogies validate existing kinship ties and
organisation. Like genealogies too, charter myths can be fabricated, refurbished and
manipulated according to current need, but never losing their strong motivational
power and emotional appeal."
(16) The famous Yoruba-Ibo conflicts of the late 1940s, 1950s and 1960s aptly illustrate the
sharpening of this 'us' vs 'they' dichotomy.
(17) Under colonial rule, this process was gingered by the Africanisation policies that
were embarked upon in the final days. In Nigeria, Africanisation easily became
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regionalisation and ethnicisation.
(18) This approach, as the name suggests, combines ethnic analysis and class analysis.
(19) This argument closely resembles that made by modernisation scholars-that the
underdeveloped states will develop to become like the developed states. This is not the
place to re-open this fruitless controversy, but I think that it is a valid argument to the
extent that the underdeveloped states accept models of development based on, and
recommended by, the developed states.
(20) Often times, the interests of the elite groups and the masses groups conflict.
(21) One reason that could be proffered for this is that the masses have closer and more
direct contact with their likes from other ethnic groups with whom they inhabit the
densely populated urban slums. They are consequently more exposed to ethnic
stimuli.
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